Taken
from
Hijra: Story and Significance
Zakaria Bashir, The
Islamic Foundation, ISBN 0-86037-124-7
The Political
Implications of the Hijra
At the beginning of the fifteenth
century of Hijra, we consider afresh the importance and value of
the
Hijra' in the political history of Islam. Everyone agrees that the
Hijra ushered in the
beginning of the first civilisation of Islam.
However, there seems to be precious little
appreciation of the
primarily ideological and political significance of that event in
the
establishment of the Islamic society. In what follows, we
attempt to expose the shortcomings of
some current interpretations
of the Hijra, and advance (hopefully) more satisfactory ones that
do
justice to this most crucial event in the evolution of early
Muslim society and subsequent Muslim
history.
WHAT THE
HIJRA IS NOT
Let us begin with two current interpretations of the
Hijra which, in our view, fall far short of
giving it its rightful
place in the formative history of Islam. The first interpretation is
the
flight interpretation. The second is the arbitration
interpretation. Both are unknown in Muslim
sources. They have been
adopted, and introduced into Muslim thought, by Western and
Orientalist
scholars.
The flight interpretation represents
the Hijra as a flight from the Makkan crucible - as a running
away,
so to speak, from persecution by the polytheists of Makka. Early
Western accounts of the
Hijra, almost all, systematically use the
term `flight' to describe the Prophet's Hijra from Makka
to
Madina. In view of the obvious unambiguous connotation of the Arabic
word `Hijra' (the
straightforward literal English rendering of
which is `emigration') one cannot but wonder why
Orientalists have
preferred to use the word `flight' instead. Given good faith, the
negative
connotation of the word `flight' should have deterred
anyone, seeking to elucidate the true
significance of the Hijra,
from using it. Any implication that the Hijra was in fact a
withdrawal
from the ideological war that raged in Makka, between
nascent Islam and its pagan adversaries, is,
from the account we
have given above, a gross misinterpretation.
More substantial
than the flight theory is the arbitration theory. According to this,
Yathrib
(Madina) was going through a period characterised by
anarchy and conflict. The two leading tribes
of Aws and Khazraj
were on the brink of open warfare over the control of the city. The
Jewish
settlers there seemed to have failed in their efforts to
mediate between the two warring tribes,
and it is not far-fetched
to suggest that they might even have contributed, in some measure,
to
the perpetuation of the conflict. Such a perpetuation would
have given them the privileged status
of playing the roles of
judges and arbitrators each time there was a fresh outbreak
of
hostilities.
According to the theory, the Yathribites
invited the Prophet to come to Madina because they were
weary of
the continuing wars and hostilities. They wanted him to act as
arbitrator in the age-long
dispute between Aws and Khazraj. They
were quite ready to accept the implications of the role they
were
offering the Prophet. Most important among these implications was the
acceptance of the
Prophet's authority over the city of
Yathrib.
It is our contention that, substantial and
intelligent as it is, the arbitration theory does not
do justice
to the full meaning of the Hijra. Evidence from the Sirah of Ibn
Hisham depicting the
events of the Second Pledge of 'Aqaba
sufficiently refutes, we believe, the main point of the
arbitration
theory - that the Yathribites grew weary of the war amongst
themselves and urgently
needed an arbitrator. Firstly, the second
pledge has been termed the Pledge of War by all the
Muslim
biographers of the Prophet. The reason for this is that it contained
a commitment, notably
absent from the first 'Aqaba pledge, to
fight, should that become necessary for the defence and
safety of
the Prophet himself, or his followers, once they arrived in Madina.
By contrast, the
first 'Aqaba pledge was called the Pledge of
Women because it was mainly a pledge to abide by the
moral
standards and religious rules and obligations of Islam, the kind of
commitments women have
to make when they accept Islam. There was
no mention of fighting in the first 'Aqaba pledge.
Rather than
being in search of an arbitrator, the Yathribites were, in fact,
seeking the Prophet
with the Divine mission whose appearance was
foretold by the people with Scripture living in
Yathrib. In
particular, the Jews of Yathrib were anxiously awaiting his coming.
Secondly, the
terms of the second 'Aqaba pledge leave little doubt
as to the attitude of those leaders of Aws
and Khazraj who
accepted them. Ibn Hisham, quoting Ibn Ishaq, has given the following
account:
Ibn Ish aq said: The Pledge of War took place after
God had given permission to His Messenger,
upon him be peace, to
wage war. It comprised conditions other than those which he [the
!Prophet]
had laid down in the first `Aqaba Pledge. The first
pledge was in the manner of the Pledge of
Women because God had
not then given permission to His Messenger, upon him be peace, to
wage war.
When God gave permission to wage it, and the Messenger
of God, upon him be peace, then took the
pledge in the last 'Aqaba
for waging war on any of his persecutors [lit. on people be they red
or
black] he took conditions for himself [i.e. for his protection]
and took further conditions from
those people for [obedience to]
his Lord. He made Paradise the reward for the keeping and
fulfilling
of that pledge.
Ibn Ishaq said: I have been told by `Ubadah
ibn al-Walid ibn `Ubadah ibn al-Samit on the authority
of his
father al-Walid, on the authority of his grandfather `Ubadah ibn
al-Samit, who was one of
the Nuqaba' [deputies], that: The
Messenger of God, upon him be peace, has taken from us the
Pledge
of War. `Ubadah was one of the Twelve Nuqaba' who had taken the
`Pledge of Women' at.the,
first `Aqaba that we obey the Prophet in
times of hardship and times of ease, (to fulfil any
undertaking
irrespective of whether we like or hate it, even against our
self-interest). We shall
not contest the authority of those in
charge, and we say the truth wherever we are, not fearing
when
obeying God, the censure of anyone.
Further evidence that the
Aws and Khazraj tribes of Yathrib were committing themselves to fight
in
defence of the Prophet and the oppressed Muslims of Makka is
provided by a statement made by one
of their leaders, namely
al-`Abbas ibn Ubadah ibn Nadlah al-Ansari. During the enactment of
the
second 'Aqaba pledge, when the Yathribite delegation of
eighty-three men and women were about to
enter the phase of
handshaking (an act signalling official conclusion of the pledge), he
reminded
everyone that they were giving a solemn pledge to wage
war against whoever happened to oppose the
Prophet, `be they red
or black'; and that if they doubted their ability to honour the
pledge when
their lives were endangered or their money or property
threatened, then they should be wise enough
not to make it.
However, the delegation was wholeheartedly adamant in its
determination both to
make and to honour that commitment at any
cost, whether to their lives or their property. They
then went on
to give a reassuring demonstration of their resolve to honour the
defence pact. As
soon as the handshaking was completed, they asked
permission of the Prophet to make a raid against
the Quraysh, the
chief oppressors of the Muslims. But the Prophet calmed them, saying
that he had
not as yet received any order or permission to wage
war.
This refutes conclusively, in our view, the arbitration
theory proposed by a leading Orientalist.
Far from being either a
flight or a retreat, the Hijra, and the Pledge that made it
possible,
firmly ushered in the beginning of a positive and
effective stage in the process of inviting the
people to Islam and
establishing the first Muslim civilisation. It provided a point of
departure
in the life of the early Muslims, who, for thirteen
years, had been commanded by the Prophet not
to retaliate against
their persecutors and oppressors, but rather to endure patiently
and
courageously the indignities which the ignorant and,
ultimately, ineffective polytheists of Makka
were wont to heap
upon them. From the Hijra onwards the Muslims were granted permission
to fight
in self-defence. They were permitted to wage war to
liberate themselves and purge their land from
the unseemly and
unjust practices of the polytheists who transgressed against them and
caused them
physical and moral suffering. The transformation from
the passive to the active stage was only
made possible by the
resolved will of the Yathribites, leaders of the Aws and Khazraj, to
wage war
on behalf of the Prophet and his oppressed followers.
Thus it is totally implausible to suggest
that the Yathribites
invited the Prophet to come to Madina because they needed someone who
would
end the dispute in which they were involved.
THE
POSITIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HIJRA
It is interesting to speculate
about the wisdom of restraining the Muslims from fighting, even
in
self-defence, throughout the Makkan period. Perhaps it was
important that their character, their
fortitude and forbearance in
the cause of Islam, should be severely tested. Probably it was
futile
to fight when they did not possess the necessary force, in
numbers or arms, to wage a successful
war. Perhaps it was that
Islam needed a period of time in which to establish itself peacefully
and
on the merit of its own intrinsic spiritual and moral
strength, without the further support of
military force. Whatever
the reasons that led to the absolute prohibition of fighting which
the
Prophet imposed on his early, much-oppressed followers, the
situation was dramatically changed as
soon as the Muslims managed
to secure a political and military presence in the territory
of
Yathrib by the voluntary consent of the vast majority of its
population.
Only after Yathrib had been secured as a base upon
which a Muslim authority could be set up, was
it possible for
Muslim civilisation to take root and expand. If we are to draw the
moral from the
Hijra, if we wish to be guided by its positive
implications, then we must reflect adequately and
at length upon
the conditions and imperatives which made possible the first Muslim
society, the
first Muslim civilisation in Madina.
THE
TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE
Islam is not only a body of ideals and
doctrines, but a practical system of politics and laws. As
such it
seeks to realise in practice its model of society, state and
civilisation. Now, no
society, state or civilisation can be formed
without a territorial base. So long as the Muslims
remained
without a secure and defensible territory, they could not
realistically hope to obtain or
defend their human rights. So long
as they remained residents of a non-Muslim land they could not
aspire
to the achievement of their ideals, nor even live with honour and
justice. Thus, the
securing of a self-sufficient and defensible
land becomes the first imperative in the way of
forming a Muslim
civilisation.
The Prophet must have understood, through Divine
revelation, and must consequently have deemed
futile any attempt
to exhaust the Muslims' energies or sacrifice their lives in a
fruitless armed
struggle within the framework of the Makkan
society. If the Muslims had embarked upon a course of
violent
confrontation with the Makkan polytheists, they might have been
utterly destroyed and
their religion with them. Passive resistance
was the best policy for survival when a small group
of peaceful,
unarmed men found themselves face to face with the unlimited,
unchecked power of an
evil and immoral state.
THE
IDEOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE
A Muslim civilisation is one founded on
the principles and articles of Islam and rooted in the
bonds of
religious fraternity of the Muslim community. For this reason, a
Muslim society is
ideological and the basis for belonging to it is
a commitment to the common feelings, beliefs and
convictions of
the people rightly included in it. The essence of the fundamental
transformation
which the new-born Islam was able to bring to the
Arabian society lay in its substitution of this
ideological basis
for the blood `Asabiyyah of Jahiliyyah (pagan-barbaric) times. The
Muslim
society is thus an open society, ready to include and
embrace anyone willing to belong to it.
Belonging to it means
nothing more or less than having a willingness and a commitment to
abide by
its rules. The widening human, egalitarian horizons which
Islam opens up in this respect are quite
unmatched. If we ponder
but for a moment on the barriers that divide the human race in
the
contemporary world, then we are-as Muslims- justified in
feeling a sense of gratitude and
satisfaction in the progressive
and liberalising tendency of Islam. Human societies today are
based
either on narrow nationalistic or often false patriotic sentiments.
There are even some
societies that are based on blatant racialism
or have strong cultural biases exclusive and inhuman
in their
norms
and ideals. Communist societies are based upon an
ideology which denies and undermines most of
what is
characteristically human in us and rejects totally any Divine or
spiritual quality of
life. Capitalist societies are so much geared
towards material self-interest that the liberties
they acclaim are
often empty and hollow.
Islamic civilisation in Yathrib was
only based upon ideological commitment - a commitment that was
as
broad and open as it was human in scope. The ideological society
could not have existed without
a territory. Nor would it have been
possible had it not been for the supreme and unchallenged
political
authority that Muslims enjoyed in Madina.
POLITICAL AUTHORITY
The third imperative is therefore that of political authority and
political control. Islam is not
like any other religion because it
lays clear and unambiguous claim to government. It has a
political
theory as well as a positive law of its own. Without the
materialisation of its
political theory and the enforcement of its
positive law, the Islamic community cannot and will
not be in a
position to thrive and prosper, nor uphold its characteristic
sociological features,
norms and values. The Prophet clearly
recognised the vitality of the state and the political
authority
of a truly Muslim environment and society. Because of this, he
explicitly demanded, and
obtained, the acceptance of his personal
authority in his capacity as Messenger of God over the
city of
Yathrib. This demand was explicitly mentioned as one of the
conditions of the second
'Aqaba Pledge, and the Yathribites
explicitly assented to it by declaring their intention and
firm
commitment not to contest the authority of the new
administration which they were by contract,
conscious desire and
explicit pledge, inviting to their own city. And they made this
solemn pledge
without any motive of self-interest or in any hope
of some `return' for political support. These
three imperatives -
territorial, the ideological and political control - are the
necessary
conditions for the establishment of a Muslim community.
Without their realisation, the Muslim
cannot rightly entertain any
hopes of falah (well-being).
THE MOBILISATION OF THE MUSLIM
CHARACTER
The establishment of the Muslim community could not
have been carried out without the personal
effort and commitment
of the individual Muslim. The human element was, and is, and always
will be,
one of the most essential factors in any historical
change. It was therefore important that the
Muslim character
should be raised to the highest level of commitment and competence in
pursuit of
the ideals of Islam. The task of building up a strong,
reflective Muslim personality is very great
indeed, and that of
realising the dreams and values of a conscious Muslim personality is
even
greater -because in the second stage of establishing a Muslim
civilisation, the Muslims have to
contend with contrary forces and
contrary interests. But the two responsibilities
interpenetrate:
strife against the inner urges of the self in a
sense is continued in the strife against the more
tangible,
aggressive, external forces. The Muslim character is put to the test
when, while
upholding faith within, it must face exacting demands
from without. The time of persecution in
Makka was, equally with
the active Madina phase, just such a putting to the test.
A
revolutionising process is essential to bring about a new awareness
in the individual
consciousness - an awareness that will enable
him to understand that his personal dignity and
honour, as well as
his personal safety, are at stake should he fail to create the
society and the
state in which he can expect to live in honourable
peace and security. He should not expect to
declare his ideals as
a Muslim and live by them in a non-Muslim society without that
society
attempting to encroach on, to limit, his rights.
But
the new awareness of himself as a Muslim is needed also to shake the
individual free of false
identities, and false hopes that he may
be accepted as a full Muslim in a non-Muslim society. It
is
important that all such hopes of belonging to non-Muslim communities,
of being accepted by them
with honour and justice and equality,
should be shed and exposed as mere fantasies. Non-Muslim
societies
will never accept nor enable a truly conscious Muslim - a Muslim who
is aware of his
full identity as Muslim - to realise the ideals of
Islam. His attitude and behaviour will be bound
to evoke feelings
of aversion and outright enmity from persons who are confirmed
citizens of the
non-Muslim society. The only way for him to
achieve some kind of quick peace or acceptance in such
a society
is to compromise his beliefs or to be hypocritical, developing in the
process an
inferiority complex vis-a-vis the dominant non-Muslim
society.
The only way to avoid these wretched consequences is
to challenge the sterile communities and
cultures that refuse to
heed the Divine call of Islam. Here it is important to shake away
false
spatio-temporal identities- identities with a certain place
and with the present in which it
expresses itself. The Muslim
must, as part of the revolutionising process, be emancipated from
the
here-and-now requirements of the material environment. He must
aspire to a more fertile, more
receptive, more sympathetic and
generous, a much broader, set of here-and-nows. It is perhaps
with
this in mind that most Muslim authorities have labelled all
non-Muslim environments Dar al-Harb as
distinct from Dar al-Islam.
It was perhaps also with this intent that the Prophet was
explicitly
commanded by the Qur'an not to extend protection or
social responsibilities to those who failed to
make the Hijra and
thus failed to appreciate the importance of earning the protection of
the
Muslim government through the emancipating, but
sacrificedemanding process of the Hijra.
In our contemporary
efforts to recreate a Muslim civilisation which will satisfy our
aspirations
and realise our vision of a just society which is both
Divinely-guided and sensitive to the plight
of the modern man, we
must give thought to the political implications of the Hijra. It
provides a
living, historical example of what is possible in the
greatest adversity, and a living symbol and
ideal of what is
desirable, both for the individual Muslim and for the Muslim state.
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